Security in an Era of Strategic Upheaval

The international order is not merely in a phase of instability. The term Zeitenwende, frequently cited in Germany, refers to a transformed security-policy reality: military capabilities and alliance commitments constitute central categories of the capacity to act politically (Schmoll, 2025).

Against this backdrop, I argue that current geopolitical developments, particularly with regard to Greenland and the Arctic region, are not marginal issues. From my perspective as a North German, living only two hours from the Danish border, Greenland is probably closer to me than to others. Nevertheless, it applies to everyone that current developments are an expression of a global power competition. This power competition is relevant for the security policy of Germany and Europe. In the face of this uncertainty, states are increasingly attempting to reorganize political agency institutionally as well. One such proposal is the Board of Peace of the U.S. administration. However, it provides fewer answers to current challenges than insights into existing tensions and evident problems in the international system. Publicized as a “milestone […] [and] Resolution 2803 (2025) of the United Nations Security Council” (White House, 2026) and presented in direct substantive connection with the Gaza Strip, the coastal strip is no longer even mentioned in the published document. This suggests that the establishment of the Board of Peace in the United States is driven more by the pursuit of a global approach and entirely new institutions under U.S. leadership, and less by an interest in regional crises and their management or even resolution.

Greenland - strategic realism

Strategic Realism

Against this background, the German Zeitenwende is less a normative new beginning than a delayed adjustment to an already transformed international security environment. Power politics, territorial revisionism, and the erosion of security-policy certainties make it clear that peace cannot be understood as a self-sustaining condition. Peace also rests on defensive capability (Schmoll, 2025).

This insight is not new; yet it appears to have been important for many to ignore or even forget it for as long as possible. In 1979, Kenneth Waltz wrote on this issue: “States operate in an anarchic international system in which security is a scarce good.” The structure of the system must therefore be central to the analysis. This implies that institutions such as NATO or the EU provide protection only insofar as they are supported by power and credible deterrent capabilities. Institutional cooperation without credible security capacities loses its effectiveness (Schmoll, 2025). This observation is well established, as defensive realism (Jervis, 1978) and realist approaches more broadly (cf. Mearsheimer, 2001) demonstrate that states pursue security through deterrence, readiness to defend, and alliance commitments, rather than necessarily through aggressive expansion. Against this theoretical background, German security policy can also be understood as a pragmatic response to heightened uncertainty and power competition, manifested in efforts to strengthen security capabilities and take alliance obligations seriously (Schmoll, 2025).

The Periphery Is a Thing of the Past

Greenland exemplifies this strategic geography. The island is not an isolated outpost but part of a security-policy space that is gaining importance as a result of climate change, emerging maritime routes, and the growing military presence of multiple actors. Greenland is therefore less a regional issue than a global one.

Although Germany is not an Arctic state, it is embedded in these developments as a NATO member, an actor within the EU, and by virtue of its geographical proximity to Denmark. It is also worth noting the Danish minority in Schleswig-Holstein. Early warning capabilities, strategic sea lanes, and the increasing military presence of major powers contribute to Greenland and the Arctic gaining security-policy relevance and being increasingly perceived as arenas of geopolitical competition (Gricius, 2021; Huebert & Lagassé, 2025).

The literature emphasizes that the Arctic security environment is increasingly shaped by strategic rivalry and that states also outside Europe such as Canada are compelled to realign their security-policy positions and defense planning in response to competition with Russia and China (Huebert & Lagassé, 2025). The Arctic thus constitutes a strategic region in which military presence, surveillance capabilities, and control over spatial access are of central importance.

Security Commitments Instead of Symbolic Politics

How, then, should these challenges be addressed—namely disputes within NATO structures, the breakdown of bilateral cooperation, and the termination of established communication channels, all of which we are currently witnessing?

One possible response lies in the creation of new institutions such as the aforementioned Board of Peace. However, such initiatives carry the risk of fragmenting responsibility. Their structures create parallel organizations without necessarily generating additional security capabilities (Magid, 2026). The strong concentration of decision-making authority (Trump), flexible membership rules, and financial entry requirements raise questions of legitimacy, transparency, credibility, and long-term reliability. Particularly in strategically sensitive regions such as the Arctic, it becomes evident that security cannot be generated through institutional symbolism, but must instead be grounded in robust capabilities and reliable alliances.

The Guiding Principle of Strategic Realism

Against the backdrop of the strategic upheavals outlined above, the German Zeitenwende can be understood as an expression of strategic realism. Security is not a normative condition but must be actively organized; this includes credible military capabilities, societal resilience, and dependable alliances.

Developments in Greenland and the Arctic illustrate this dynamic in exemplary fashion. Areas long regarded as peripheral are gaining strategic significance in the context of geopolitical competition, military presence, and emerging security vulnerabilities. This shift highlights the reconfiguration of security-policy priorities, as traditional geographical margins increasingly move to the center of political and military attention.

The debate surrounding new peace and security institutions simultaneously underscores the danger of responding to structural uncertainty with institutional symbolic politics. Parallel structures that fail to generate additional security capabilities risk fragmenting responsibility and weakening existing alliances.

Existing security commitments—particularly within NATO and the EU—should therefore not be relativized by symbolic alternatives or questionable institutional reinventions. Instead, they should be consistently utilized and further developed. In this sense, the Zeitenwende is less a political state of exception than a necessary adaptation to contemporary security realities (Schmoll, 2025).

References

• Gricius, M. (2021). Conceptualising the Arctic as a Zone of Conflict. Central European Journal of International and Security Studies.

• Huebert, R., & Lagassé, P. (2025). Strategic Outlook 2025: Canada in Dangerous Times.

Conference of Defence Associations Institute.

• Magid, P. (2026). US Board of Peace: A New Approach to Global Conflicts. Times of Israel.

• Schmoll, Melanie Carina. (2025). Zeitenwende in Germany – a new realistic worldview and its implications. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 28(4), 34–46.

• Mearsheimer, J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton.

• Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

•White House (2026): https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2026/01/statement-on-president-trumps-comprehensive-plan-to-end-the-gaza-conflict/

• Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214.