Why Realism Still Matters.

Is historical constructivism the only valid approach to understanding the past? In this post, I argue that political realism offers crucial insights—especially when analyzing key turning points in German history. From Bismarck to the Cold War, material interests and power structures have shaped events in ways discourse alone cannot explain.

Realism in History

Yesterday, I had a conversation with a colleague that continues to resonate with me. In a side comment, she mentioned that, for historians today, it is only possible to view the world from a constructivist perspective. She presented this as a truism, neither open to discussion nor tolerant of alternative views. In her opinion, constructivism is not only the theoretical foundation of historical research but the only legitimate approach to the past. In making such an exclusive claim, she entirely dismissed my own perspective.

I am a historian and a political scientist. I have engaged deeply with theoretical frameworks in both disciplines—of course including constructivist approaches, but also the theories of political realism. I understand the arguments on both sides, and precisely for that reason, I find it problematic to declare constructivism as the sole valid theoretical lens.

Constructivism, as prominently articulated by Alexander Wendt (1992), assumes that social reality is not objectively given but constructed through language, discourse, norms, and collective identities. For historians, this means that history is not simply “what happened,” but is always interpreted and conveyed through subjective narratives, cultural frameworks, and social contexts. This perspective is undoubtedly legitimate. It raises awareness of the role of language, memory, and interpretation in historical development.

But it also has clear limitations.

If we view history solely as the result of discursive constructions, we risk losing sight of the material conditions, power interests, and security imperatives that shape historical events. This is where my understanding of history begins. Political realism, particularly as developed by Hans J. Morgenthau (1948) and Kenneth Waltz (1979), posits that political actors operate in a system of international anarchy, where power, security, and national interest are the primary drivers of behavior.

This logic is especially evident in German history. A purely constructivist interpretation of the “national awakening” in the 19th century focuses on symbols, myths, and identities. But the founding of the German Empire in 1871 was the result of classical power politics: Bismarck’s “unification from above” through wars against Denmark, Austria, and France aimed not only at cultural unity, but at establishing Prussian dominance in Central Europe—and, above all, at securing power relative to France.

In 1914, the powerful German Empire once again followed the logic of power-driven expansion. Its foreign policy in the years leading up to World War I (1914–1918) was defined by the pursuit of great power status, famously framed as securing Germany’s own “place in the sun.” This bid for world power ultimately failed, with catastrophic consequences.

In 1939, it was once again the desire to revise the international order that drove Germany to war. Hitler’s ideology may have been discursively charged, but the practical execution followed a power-political logic: expansion to the East, securing “living space,” and eliminating rival great powers. Despite its more than brutal ideological character, the Second World War (1939–1945) was also a classic hegemonic war.

Even the German reunification of 1990, often viewed through the lens of identity and internal unity, reveals a clear strategic dimension. West German foreign policy under Helmut Kohl skillfully navigated the international system to gain support for reunification. The guarantee that a unified Germany would remain in NATO was not only a reassurance of its own security commitments but also a strategic concession to the Western Allies. Soviet approval, for its part, was the result of structural weakness—not cultural understanding. Here, as so often in history, it was not “discursive constructions” that were decisive, but configurations of power.

That is why, for me, there is no alternative to the realist perspective, even if it originates from political theory. History is not just a matter of interpretation; it is also a matter of interests, geopolitical structures, and the material realities within which political actors operate. Especially in German history, it becomes clear: ignoring realism means understanding only half the picture—or perhaps even less.

• Alexander Wendt (1992): Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. In: International Organization, 46(2), S. 391–425.

• Hans J. Morgenthau (1948): Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

• Kenneth N. Waltz (1979): Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.